






Presumptuous Naturalism:  
A Cautionary Tale 
 
 
Professor Daniel D. Hutto 
Professor of Philosophical Psychology 
 
School of Humanities 
University of Hertfordshire 
de Havilland Campus 
Hatfield,  
Hertfordshire  AL10 9AB 
 










“The decisive movement in the conjuring  
trick has been made,  
and it was the very one we thought quite innocent”  
 





Naturalism is the word of the day. It’s the ‘ism’ that most philosophers embrace (at 
least in English speaking climes). Wearers of the badge are a wildly diverse bunch. 
This is because there are quite different ways of being a naturalist and of conceiving 
of the naturalistic project. 
 Some naturalists take a special interest in our everyday or folk commitments. For 
them, the interesting philosophical project is to determine how much, if any, of what 
we ordinarily think about various subject matters (e.g. the mental, the moral, the 
aesthetic) is compatible with our best scientific understanding of what there is. To 
decide this, special methods have been created for (1) perspicuously representing 
our folk commitments and (2) examining if these outstrip, or go beyond, the 
commitments of a certain scientific understanding of what there is in nature. By 
these lights the philosophical task of the naturalist is to determine if the folk are 
committed to something over and above what is posited by a certain scientific world 
view. This naturalistic programme, known as the Canberra plan, relies on a special 
framework devised by its principal architect, David Lewis (1970, 1972) – a 




  Concentrating on their treatment of folk psychology, this paper seeks to establish 
that, in the form advocated by its leading proponents, the Canberra project is 
presumptuous in certain key respects. Crucially, it presumes (1) that our everyday 
practices entail the existence of implicit folk theories; (2) that naturalists ought to be 
interested primarily in what such theories say; and (3) that the core content of such 
theories is adequately characterized by establishing what everyone finds intuitively 
obvious about the topics in question. I argue these presumptions are a bad starting 
point for any naturalistic project and, more specifically, that in framing things in this 
way proponents of the Canberra plan have led us unnecessarily into philosophical 
quagmires.  
 The fundamental error is to suppose that our conceptual investigations ought to 
target (A) what the folk ‘find obvious’ about a given domain (which is putatively 
revelatory of a shared implicit theory) instead of (B) attending to what the folk do 
when competently deploying their concepts in dealing with that domain. Only the 
latter reveals the folk commitments. Focusing on what the folk find obvious, as 
Canberra planners claim to do, generates a host of methodological difficulties that 
are best avoided. Much worse than this, trying to identify what is ‘intuitively known 
by all’ typically results in contaminated pictures, of the genuine commitments of the 
folk, hogging our attention. 
 The cardinal sin of a presumptuous naturalism, as exemplified by the official 
versions of the Canberra plan, is that it makes it appear as if it is a simple matter to 
obtain an accurate understanding of folk commitments. Focusing on what anyone 
and everyone will find ‘obvious’ about some domain aids, abets and seemingly 
legitimizes certain popular but biased pictures of our folk commitments. This 
becomes dangerous when, by fuelling our intuitions, such pictures set important 
philosophical agendas and play a leading role in evaluating the adequacy of 
philosophical proposals. 
 In section three, using Jaegwon Kim as a stalking horse, I illustrate a clear 
instance of the kinds of difficulties that attend adopting this sort of starting point, 
focusing on the so-called ‘problem’ of mental causation. Examination of this case 
reveals that it is attachment to a certain popular understanding of our folk 
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psychological commitments – specifically, the idea that a productive notion of 
causation is required for making sense of human agency – that not only creates ‘the 
problem’ but also determines what any acceptable ‘solution’ must look like.  
 Against this, in section four, I show that a close examination of our everyday 
practice of deploying mental predicates to explain actions reveals no logically 
compelling grounds for supposing that the folk must be operating with a productive 
notion of causation. This is something inherited from elsewhere. Indeed, a quick 
review of how the philosophical community became convinced that reasons and 
reason explanations are causal in the first place (in some sense, in some cases) reveals 
that we would have no inclination to attribute a commitment to the notion of 
productive causation to the folk if we did not already buy into a certain picture of how 
mental states cause actions. Which picture? Well, the very one promoted by the 
standard Lewisian, commonsense functionalist analysis of the platitudes of folk 
psychology– an analysis that allegedly states only what the folk find obvious about 
the mental and nothing more.  
 If the diagnosis of this paper is correct then it serves as a cautionary tale. We 
ought to heed Wittgenstein’s warnings about the dangers of being taking in by 
beguiling pictures – those that systematically obscure a clear vision of our actual use 
of concepts in various contexts.2  That warning, it seems, is as pertinent today as 
ever. My aim is to show that any naturalism that takes a serious interest in 
understanding our folk commitments must adopt a different and more unassuming 
starting point than that proposed by the Canberra planners. 
 
2.  Naturalistic Ambitions 
 
There is more than one way to conceive of the naturalistic project. Some forms of 
naturalism take no special interest in our everyday or folk conceptions. For example, 
this is true of Quine’s scientistic naturalism. For him, the business of the naturalist is 
to provide adequate conceptions of what there is – conceptions that can 
economically account for the rich fabric of our sayings and doings (and hence 
adequate for all our practical scientific needs) in ways that are consistent with the 
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raw deliverances of sensory stimulation. Convinced by a series of arguments (most 
famously, one that allegedly dissolves the analytic/synthetic distinction), he saw the 
task of philosophy and science as the same: telling us not only what there is but also 
how it is possible for us to know what there is (in a way consistent with the first 
answer). Ultimately, the job is to make sense of the scientific worldview using 
nothing other than the best resources provided by the scientific worldview itself; 
“we seek no firmer basis for science than science itself; so we are free to use the very 
fruits of science in investigating its roots” (Quine 1995, 16).3 
 Quineians assume that we operate with theories in our everyday dealings with 
the world and that these theories are the inevitable starting points of inquiry.4 It is 
conceded that these theories are never wholly abandoned (see Gibson 1996 for a 
useful discussion). Nevertheless, to satisfy Quineian ambitions, our lay conceptual 
schemes (our theories) require significant enrichment and extension to be of any 
interest to those engaged in the task of developing plausible stories about what there 
is. Folk conceptions are simply too ungainly, vague and unregimented to be 
serviceable for such work. For this reason Quineian naturalists take no special 
interest in what the folk say and think. 
 Other contemporary naturalists adopt a similar attitude to our folk conceptions 
despite having a more liberal, and less empiricist-based, project in mind. For 
example, Kim Sterelny (2003) offers a vision of the naturalistic project in which 
philosophy, although recognized as not one of the natural sciences, does 
indispensable service in enabling us to understand our place in nature. Working 
alongside the sciences, one of its major tasks is to integrate their findings into a 
consistent and coherent story – a story that would allow us to understand a wide 
range of interesting and important phenomena. On the list are such things as how 
“creatures manage to perform in a way that shows they are tracking the 
environment, planning ahead, responding to certain stimuli and ignoring others, 
grouping perceptual information together in particular ways, and so on” (Kingsbury 
and McKeown-Green 2009, 174). Sterelny-style naturalists are therefore interested in 
what the folk get up to as potential explananda. They might also be interested to 
discover if what the folk think about a specific subject matter happens to be true. But 
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this is not because they harbor any special, antecedent interest in folk conceptions in 
themselves. It is rather because such conceptions can provide initial inspirational 
fodder for the development of scientific theories in certain domains. Indeed, in some 
domains, such as cognitive science it is often the case that elements of folk thinking 
remain at the heart of certain advanced theories.  
 Matters are different with Canberra Planners. By way of direct contrast, their 
project depends on accurately characterizing our folk commitments. Their 
foundational first step begins with the effort to collect, collate and present our folk 
commitments in a logically perspicuous way. Ultimately, this is preparatory work 
for a second step; that of determining if – and to what extent – such commitments 
are satisfied by something in nature, whether perfectly, imperfectly or not at all. 
 In what follows, I concentrate exclusively on the presumptions associated with 
the first step of the Canberra plan. What does it involve? Focusing on Lewis’ classic 
treatment of folk psychology (still the most influential instance of Canberra planning 
to date), we are famously told: “Collect all the platitudes … regarding the causal 
relations of mental states, sensory stimuli, and motor responses. … Add also all the 
platitudes to the effect that one mental state falls under another … Perhaps there are 
platitudes of other forms as well. Include only the platitudes which are common 
knowledge amongst us: everyone knows them, everyone knows that everyone else 
knows them, and so on” (Lewis 1972, 256). 
  Once the collection of platitudes is in hand it is possible, through technical 
manipulation, to make our folk psychological commitments explicit. This is done by 
collating all of the individual platitudes into a single, conjunctive sentence. In the 
first instance this sentence will consist of a string of T-terms, in this case terms 
standing for mental states (e.g. beliefs, desires, etc.), and O-terms, in this case terms 
standing for other things that are not part of the theory (e.g. sensory promptings, 
behavioural responses, etc.). This sentence articulates the ‘postulate’ that is the core 
of our folk psychology, revealing the distinctive roles played by the various mental 
state concepts and how they stand in relation to other things. 
 Once each occurrence of the mental states terms is replaced by free variables and 
the whole is prefixed by an existential quantifier, we get the Ramsey sentence for 
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folk psychology. This is important to stage two of the Canberra project since it is 
possible in principle to replace the free variables (standing for mental state terms) 
with terms in some other vocabulary standing for non-mental phenomena. Thus the 
stage one work of collecting and analyzing folk platitudes is a prelude to 
determining what, if anything, in the natural world (e.g. as identified by 
neuroscience or physics) might play the sorts of network roles of the mental states 
identified by the folk theory. Of course, it is possible that nothing in reality plays 
exactly such roles and that the states in question will have miscellaneous occupiers. 
If so, the theoretical commitments of the folk will not be satisfied in the way those of 
our best final theory are hoped to be – allegedly only that theory has a real chance of 
being perfectly and uniquely realized by the natural properties upon which all else 
supervenes. 
 In this way, Canberra planners assume that folk psychology is a term-introducing 
theory and that its core commitments are captured by the relevant platitudes. The 
platitudes are meant to express what the folk find obvious about the mental.  There 
are a number of problems with these assumptions.  
 One major worry is how to make sense of the claim that folk psychology is a 
theory. Lewis (1994) says that folk psychology is a body of tacit knowledge rather 
like our knowledge of syntax. Jackson tells us, “As I use the phrase ‘folk psychology’ 
it stands for a certain theory about what the world is like … very many people 
believe this theory, which is why I think it is right to call it a folk theory. In the same 
way I think that many people hold the theory that, as a rule, unsupported bodies 
fall” (Jackson, Mason and Stich 2009, 48). Either way folk psychology is thought to 
name a contentful and structurally well-defined theory implicitly held by the folk.  
 A tempting interpretation of such remarks suggests that the Canberra planners 
are presupposing the existence of bodies of knowledge that explain our 
classificatory abilities – i.e. bodies of knowledge composed of representations with 
truth evaluable contents that are stored in our minds or brains. It is easy to find 
support for such a reading. For example, Jackson holds that what becomes visible 
through the process of platitude analysis is the pattern that the folk implicitly 
recognize in making their everyday classifications and judgments. Additionally, he 
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tells us that “it is the pattern that drives the classifications – not some set of sentences. 
Of course, there will be two patterns – the one in the sentences and the one in the 
brain. This follows from the fact that the classifications go via the brain” (Jackson, 
Mason and Stich 2009, 61, emphasis added).   
 Elsewhere he writes of the project:  
 
It is all to do with the availability to the subject of sentences that capture what 
they[the folk] believe – of, that is, sentences that represent as their minds do when 
they believe that P, where P is the theory we are talking about (Jackson, Mason 
and Stich 2009, 59, emphasis added). 
 
 On the face of it, it looks as if taking folk psychology to be an implicit theory 
entails a rather substantive view about the nature of minds – i.e. that they contain 
truth evaluable representational contents that are capable of driving thought and 
actions. In particular, it appears that the having of certain beliefs (understood as 
contentful mental representations) explains why the folk endorse the various 
platitudes about the mental that they do. This would, of course, account for the 
proposed link between the platitudes and the content of folk’s implicit theory of 
mind.  
 But this presumes too much, given the stated ambitions of Canberra planners. 
The representational theory of mind is a substantial (and much contested) theory in 
cognitive science. Indeed, many argue that the primary defect of such a theory is 
that it models mental representations too closely on linguistic representations, thus 
ruinously impeding a proper understanding of the actual basis of cognition.5 The 
issue is hotly debated. Although we cannot know the outcome in advance, we do 
know that it depends on sustained, philosophical argument and scientific 
investigation. Thus it cannot be the case that the existence of a representational 
theory of mind is secured in advance (and can be known to be true) because the folk 
operate with implicit theories. The natural reading of the idea that folk psychology 
just is an implicit theory seems to entail, in its very setup, that eliminativism is ruled 
out (cf. Jackson, Mason and Stich 2009, 63). That begs important questions in a very 
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blatant way - questions that the Canberra planners fully intend to leave open. 
Hence, the tempting reading must be rejected. 
 A lighter reading is possible. Like Quine, many contemporary analytic 
philosophers take for granted that the making of any kind of assumption, judgment 
or classification constitutes operating with or having a theory. This fits with 
Jackson’s understanding that “to have a theory is to have a certain view about how 
things are” (Jackson, Mason and Stich 2009, 87). Indeed it seems that this is what 
allegedly makes the truth of theory-theory ‘near enough analytic’ (Jackson 1999, 80). 
The thought here seems to be that simply by engaging in the practice of explaining 
actions by appeal to mental predicates the folk reveal their implicit commitment to 
the existence of such things as beliefs and desires. That is certainly true and 
uncontroversial; the folk surely believe in beliefs and desires. Since the folk make 
use of these concepts in making sense of others it is safe to say that they believe in 
beliefs and desires. For Jackson, this equates to their holding a theory about how 
things are. But the same is true of folk beliefs about golf clubs, forks, lamp shades, 
and so on. So the folk must hold theories (in Jackson’s special sense of the word) 
about anything which they deal.  
 But if this is all that is meant by ‘folk psychology’s being a theory’ then we must 
be careful to distinguish this claim from a stronger one with which it is likely to be 
confused. For it hardly follows that in believing in beliefs (having a view of how 
things are) the folk are thereby ‘positing’ the existence of mental states (or any other 
ordinary things) as theoretical entities. No compelling reason has been offered to 
suppose that this would be an appropriate characterization of their activities. Of 
course, one might claim that such a characterization provides the best description of 
what the folk are doing. But that is a substantive empirical proposal – one that, again, 
requires evidence and argument to back it up.6  It doesn’t come for free. So, again, 
on most standard renderings it is presumptuous to assume that folk ‘hold theories’.7 
 There are other problems with this idea. If one assumes that the true quarry of 
stage one platitude analysis is to get at an implicit theory held by the folk then one 
faces a problem of selection. The trouble is that the folk tend to have lots of thoughts 
and say lots of things about various topics. Canberra planners are clearly not 
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interested in most of what the folk have to say or what they think on these topics. 
Hence, “P is not everything that the folk believe about the mind” (Jackson, Mason 
and Stich 2009, 88).  Very well, but then one faces the question: Which platitudes 
genuinely reveal the folk theory? As is well known, deciding this – i.e. deciding 
which platitudes matter and the relative weights different platitudes are to be given 
– remains “a vexed question” (Nolan 2009, 278).   
 Worse still, there are serious methodological problems about how to discover the 
platitudes in the first place. Many suppose that deciding what folk psychology ‘says’ 
is, in the end, an empirical matter (Stoljar 2009, 126). But the truth is, as anyone who 
has tried to do the empirical work soon discovers, that commitments of folk 
psychology (and certainly as they are represented by Canberra planners as a cluster 
of neatly interlaced principles) cannot be “easily extracted from the kind of things 
people say” (Ratcliffe 2007, 49).8 
 Beyond all of this, there is a much more crucial reason for rejecting the idea that 
we should focus on the content of implicit folk theories, as revealed by what the folk 
find obvious or intuitive. For even if all of the aforementioned problems could be 
overcome, there is always the risk that the intuitions in question will be shaped by 
distorting pictures that have nothing to do with the way our concepts are used in 
our everyday practices. To probe what the folk find obvious when they think about 
the mental is hardly to tap a philosophically uncontaminated source of 
understanding. There is a clear and present danger that prominent folk intuitions 
about a given subject matter will be informed, not by what is integral to folk 
practices themselves, but by, say, certain popular pictures of the nature of mind – 
even if only indirectly. Indeed, there is an exceedingly high risk that this will be the 
case when the folk intuitions are really those of philosophers acting as 
spokespersons for the folk, i.e. calling on their own sense of what is obvious. 
 Worryingly, appeal to revelation of this kind is precisely the Lewisian strategy. 
When asked why he thinks X must be part of the folk theory of Y, he answers: 
“Because so many philosophers find it so very obvious. I think it seems obvious 
because it is built into folk psychology. Others will think it is built into folk 
psychology because it is so obvious; but either way, the obviousness and the folk 
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psychological status go together” (Lewis 1999, 328).  Of course, to make this story 
complete it would be handy if folk psychology existed as an implicit theory shared 
by all.9 This would explain why it is that everyone finds certain platitudes about the 
mind – specifically those associated with the commonsense functionalist model of 
the mind – so very obvious. And, if the theory were true, these intuitions would be 
justified. But as argued above, Canberra planners are not entitled to assume the 
existence of such a theory as an explanatory construct.10  
 All of these problems dissipate if one abandons an interest in revealing what the 
folk ‘find obvious’ in favour of trying to discover what is integral to their competent 
use of concepts, when these concepts are put to good work in everyday practice. 
Taking the case in hand, the first step in making this shift is to stop thinking of folk 
psychology as an implicit theory. With far less baggage, we can assume that folk 
psychology denotes – at a bare minimum – the everyday business of making sense 
of intentional actions (i.e. our own and those of others) in terms of reasons. It 
requires being able to answer a particular sort of ‘why’-question by competently 
deploying the idiom of mental predicates (beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, etc.). So 
conceived, folk psychology “is an account of how people actually understand each 
other’s behaviour, rather than an account of how they think that they think in 
interpersonal scenarios. People may not have a clear idea about what is central to 
their thinking about others, and so [folk psychology] must be distinguished from 
what we might call ‘folk folk psychology’” (Ratcliffe 2009, 381).  
 Folk psychology as a practice is a perfectly familiar, out-in-the-open, activity, not 
something hidden away in the minds of the folk. It is the sort of thing that Sterelny-
style, integrative naturalists are interested in understanding. Indeed, any credible 
story they are likely to tell about it should harmoniously integrate the findings of a 
wide range of empirical sciences – e.g. anthropology, developmental psychology, 
comparative psychology, cognitive archaeology and neuroscience. If folk 
psychology is understood in this way then there is no point in trying to probe 
commonplace intuitions in order to reveal its core commitments. There is no need to 
try to discover the content of an implicit theory held by the folk, since we have no 
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reason for presuming that there is any such a thing (for detailed arguments on this 
score see Hutto 2008a).  
 At this juncture it is important to note that there are subtle discrepancies in 
standard accounts of what the Canberra planners are really interested in – 
discrepancies that reveal how easy it is to blur the distinction between what the folk 
do and what they think about a given subject matter. For example, in describing the 
stage one ambitions of the plan, Kingsbury and Mckeown-Green (2009) take it that 
the purpose of the first step is “to work out what, if anything, the ordinary people 
are doing when they ascribe and entertain beliefs and desires or manage to stay 
conscious” (174, emphases added).  But note: working out what the folk are doing 
and working out what the folk think, as I have just been stressing, are really two 
quite different activities.  
 Arguably, if this is correct, any value in the analysis provided by commonsense 
functionalists derives from the fact that it manages to hit on at least some of what is 
integral to our folk practice.11  It is possible to re-interpret some of its illuminating 
insights along the lines of what can be thought of as a ‘practice’ (as opposed to 
‘platitudes’) analysis of folk psychology. Such an analysis would reveal the practical 
commitments of the folk – such as their commitments concerning the existence of 
beliefs, desires and other attitudes and of structural relations that hold between 
these attitudes, as revealed by the way that mentalistic concepts are used in 
prominent cases of making sense of actions in terms of reasons. Crucially, to engage 
in ‘practice’ analysis does not require assuming that the folk harbor implicit or tacit 
theories. It would be a mistake to imagine that it aims to detail the contents of some 
theory to which the folk quietly subscribe.  
 With this in mind, it may be possible to engage in something like the first stage 
work proposed by Canberra planners in a less presumptuous way. But there will be 
interesting consequences of doing so. Providing accurate descriptions of what the 
folk get up to when competently using their concepts requires painstaking 
investigation involving “philosophical work and attentiveness to the relevant 
phenomena” (Ratcliffe 2009, 385).  Such work will not take the form of probing 
intuitions, for the reason given:  Standard intuitions – even those of the allegedly 
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untutored folk – may be shaped by false pictures; pictures that can steal the 
limelight from and obscure the true character of folk commitments. Focusing on the 
standard assumption that our folk concepts are essentially causal, in what follows I 
illustrate the sorts of problems that arise from making false presumptions about the 
nature of folk commitments.  
 
3. Mental Causation and the Competition Worry 
 
Borrowing from Schopenhauer, Kim casts the problem of mental causation as an 
intractable weltknoten – a ‘world knot’ (Kim 2005, 7).12  Like all good philosophical 
conundrums it gets its life from a clash between a certain set of intuitively plausible 
assumptions none of which we can surrender but which, when taken together, are 
apparently incompatible.  Here the philosopher’s job is to make the best fit possible, 
whatever the cost. 
 The way Kim sets up the problem can be usefully compared to the structure of a 
standard magic trick. First there is the set-up or ‘the pledge’. At this point in the 
proceedings the magician reveals to the audience the subject matter to be dealt with 
and convinces them that his resources are perfectly ordinary and above board – i.e. 
he has nothing up his sleeve. Of course, this is also the point at which the audience is 
systematically duped by misdirection, and the success of the trick is guaranteed. In 
our case, attention is drawn to the fact that mental states are causally efficacious and 
hence mental concepts are causal concepts. Moreover, to underline this we are told 
that “a science that invokes mental phenomena in its explanations is presumptively 
committed to their causal efficacy; if a phenomenon is to have an explanatory role, 
its presence or absence must make a difference – a causal difference” (Kim 2005, 10).  
 Trouble and excitement immediately ensue in the form of the competition worry. 
For it looks now as if we have two different and sufficient causes, one identified by 
folk psychology and the other by some other science, both vying to do exactly the 
same explanatory work. On the assumption that over-determinacy is intolerable 
there is a problem. Assuming a functionalist framework, the root worry is that if 
mental properties are thought to be irreducible to but dependent on those of a more 
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basic sort then any causal contribution that any token mental properties might 
possibly make to the occurrence of any particular event will be systematically taken 
care of by its being realized by some or other subvenient base property. This is 
because of the relation of ontological dependence that is assumed to hold (vertically) 
between mental states and their realizers.  
 Thus exclusion is an unavoidable problem for anyone who assumes that mental 
states don’t reduce to their realizers. The problem is utterly persistent.  It arises as 
long as it is assumed that the realizers are heterogeneous (i.e. that mental properties 
are realized variously). It arises even if the supervenience base is assumed to be not 
just heterogeneous but also extended (e.g. perhaps mental properties depend not 
just on facts about X’s brain, but facts about X’s body, current environment, history, 
etc.). And it arises even if (as seems true) it is impossible that we will ever discover 
systematic laws couched either in concepts that apply to happenings at the 
subvenient level or in trans-ordinal psychophysical terms that would allow us to 
make interesting predictions or explanations concerning human reasons and actions, 
so described. 
 The competition worry arises just as long as it is assumed that there is an intimate 
metaphysical relationship of dependence – i.e. instantiation holding between mental 
properties and their realizers. Thus if we assume that mental properties have 
realizers then the latter apparently nullify, void or screen off any contribution a 
particular mental state property might make to the causal explanation of the 
occurrence of some other event.  
 At this point there is no way out. For this will be so no matter what practical 
purposes we might have for offering explanations that invoke mental predicates.  
Our purposes in giving such explanations matters not a jot when it comes to 
understanding the source of this metaphysical problem. This may not be obvious. 
Certainly the exclusion or competition worry only has teeth if we accept that reason 
explanations are causally explanatory and that reasons, or their associated mental 
states, are causes in the same way as explanations in the other sciences.13 
Consequently, it might be thought that the problem can be avoided if it turns out 
that reason explanations, in fact, provide explanations of a very different kind than 
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those of other, more basic sciences.  Evidence for this is meant to come in the form 
that we offer such explanations for completely different purposes than we do when 
giving explanations in the sciences.  
 This is surely true. In many respects reason explanations are unlike causal 
explanations found in the sciences.  Arguably, they function primarily as 
normalizing explanations (Hutto 2004, 2008a, Zawidzki 2008, Andrews 2009, Hacker 
2009, Stoecker 2009). This is revealed by the fact that they are only called for when 
the other’s actions are aberrant – i.e. when what is done violates our expectations 
and thus demands to be made intelligible. When this happens any of a wide range of 
explanatorily pertinent factors might require mention in order to make sense of X’s 
reasons for acting (e.g. facets of X’s character, X’s mood, X’s larger projects, the 
content of this or that propositional attitude of X, and so on). 
 Exactly what requires mention (and exactly how much elaboration is required) 
depends on the needs of the questioner. Crucially, like historical explanations, 
because reason explanations involve making sense of the other’s idiosyncratic take 
on things they are not general and abstract but rather take the form of narratives that 
are personal and particular. In line with the maxim of conversational implicature, 
such narratives are selective; they cite details of a person’s story – those that are 
worth mentioning in order to respond to specific, context-bound queries. Moreover, 
reason explanations are typically contrastive because in explaining why one Фed it 
is important to highlight certain factors over others that might have made a 
difference (e.g. this belief/desire pair as opposed to some other which could have 
equally explained why such an action was taken, etc). 
 But these observations are irrelevant when it comes to thinking about the 
problem of mental causation. All of this can be true (and indeed it all appears to be 
true) and yet reason explanations might be causal in the relevant sense after all. This 
will be so just in case, despite having all of the features just mentioned, what one 
cites when citing one’s reason also picks out something that makes a difference – a 
causal difference. This is why Kim gives short shrift to the general strategy of trying 
to avoid the problem of mental causation by freeing “ourselves from our 
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metaphysical preoccupations and attend[ing] to our explanatory practices involving 
mental phenomena” (Kim 2000, 60). 
 With all of this in place we are brought to see that there is simply no escaping 
“the metaphysical problem … [which] is the problem of showing how mental 
causation is possible, not whether it is possible, although of course what happens 
with the how-question may in the end induce us to reconsider our stance on the 
whether-question” (Kim 2000, 61). 
 Now that we are well and truly trapped the magician’s next step is to show us a 
way out. Once known in magical circles as ‘the turn’, this is where the trick seems to 
be performed. The resolution, according to Kim, is to accept reductionism. Really, it 
seems we have no other choice. Luckily, this is possible (he claims) – at least for 
intentional mental states – since they are amenable to functionalization.  To 
functionalize is to show that a given mental state can be wholly defined in terms of 
the causal patterns of its characteristic inputs, network relations and outputs 
between relata such as perceptions, mental states and actions. Thus Kim’s solution 
assumes that analytic functionalism (as described in section two) provides an 
appropriate starting point for analysis for at least some mental properties. If so, it 
follows that if his solution to the problem of mental causation is accepted then 
perhaps the best known brainchild of the Canberra plan will have been put to good 
use, yielding important results. Thus, “the problem of mental causation is solvable 
for a given class of mental properties if and only if these properties are functionally 
reducible with physical/biological properties as their realizers” (Kim 2005, 29 – see 
also 24).  
 And so, at this stage the trick is concluded. This is ‘the Prestige’, where all that is 
left for the magician to do is to accept the applause. Kim’s reasoning is impeccable 
and his solution elegant. The set-up, the problem and solution are all very tidy - 
perhaps, too tidy. Canny readers will have noticed that invoking functionalization 
as a solution depends on antecedently accepting a familiar story about the nature of 
mental states. For “Functionalism views mental properties as defined in terms of their 
causal roles in behavioural and physical contexts, and it is evidently committed to the 
thesis that systems alike in intrinsic physical properties must be alike in their mental 
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or psychological character. The reason is simple: we expect identically constituted 
physical systems to be causally indistinguishable in all physical and behavioural 
contexts” (Kim 2005, 14, emphases added).14 
 Equally, as Kim stresses, thinking that there is a problem about mental causation 
doesn’t depend on accepting any sophisticated philosophical premises (e.g. causal 
closure of the physical, etc). Rather it gets its life from acceptance of “a perfectly 
intuitive and ordinary understanding of the causal relation” (Kim 2000, 61, emphasis 
added); one which Kim more recently designates as our “strong intuitive conception 
of causation” (Kim 2007, 235). The troublesome, allegedly homely intuitive 
conception of causation that lies at the heart of this problem is that of productive or 
generative causation.  Kim is admirably clear about this. He consistently reminds us 
that: 
 
Causation as generation or effective production and determination, is in many 
ways stronger than mere counterfactual dependence, and it is this sense that is 
fundamentally involved in the problem of mental causation (Kim 2005, 18, 
emphases added).15  
 
Fundamentally, these worries arise, I believe, from the question whether mentality 
has the power to bring about its effects in continuous processes of generation and 
production (Kim 2007, 236, emphasis added).  
 
 All will be well for Kim if our everyday activity of making sense of actions by 
appeal to mental predicates incorporates the assumption that mental states are 
causal in a productive sense. But what if this is a presumptuous mischaracterization 
of what is implied by the use of folk concepts in practice? What if this is an 
imposition – a kind of Lewisian overlay – on what is integral to folk practice? What 
if reason explanations need not be interpreted as causal in this sense? Well, then 
there would be no competition between reason explanations and those in other 
domains, no problem of mental causation, and no prestige for solving that problem 
after all.   




4. Lessons from History and Alternative Possibilities 
   
There was a time, not very long ago, when it wasn’t obvious to philosophers that 
our everyday thought and talk about the mental was wedded to the idea that 
psychological phenomena cause and are caused by physical events (e.g. events in 
our bodies and environment). Indeed, it was widely supposed by those who gave 
detailed attention to the way our concepts operate in their everyday contexts that 
reasons were not causes and that reason explanations were not causal. 
 Famously, Davidson changed all of that. He paved the way for today’s causalist 
orthodoxy, convincing us first that there are good reasons to think that reason 
explanations are causal in important respects and making respectable the idea that 
reasons are causes.16 Crucial to his argument is the idea that citing a reason – 
understood as a particular belief/desire pair (which he calls a primary reason) – is 
not the same as citing the reason for an action. Usually a person has more than one 
primary reason for acting at any given time, yet in many circumstances only one of 
these will be the reason for the action. Relatedly, there are many alternative 
belief/desire pairs which might make a given action intelligible but it’s the selective 
citing of one such pair as opposed to some other that explains, on any given 
occasion, why the person acted (Davidson 1987, 42). 
 Consider this scenario: I promise my wife that I will wash the dishes before five 
o’clock and being a man of my word I firmly intend to do so. According to Davidson 
this counts as a primary reason, a rationale, for my doing the washing up before the 
appointed time. However, it may be the case that, despite my intention to keep this 
promise, the reason I actually do the washing up before five o’clock is because, 
unexpectedly, I get a phone call from a friend who has decided to come round for 
tea at four. Since the tea cups are at the bottom of the pile, and I don’t want my 
friend to see the kitchen in a state, I choose to do the washing up before he arrives. 
The latter reason (my desire for some clean cups and to keep a tidy house for my 
visitor) apparently pre-empts the former reason (my desire to be true to my word) in 
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bringing about, and hence causally explaining, this action. In other words, citing the 
latter reason explains (causally) why in this instance, I actually did the washing up. 
 In light of such cases, Davidson argues that we must read the ‘because’ in such 
common remarks as “I did the washing up because I wanted to impress my visitor” 
as denoting a causal relation.  What distinguishes giving a possible reason for acting 
from giving the actual reason for acting is that in the latter case we are attempting to 
pick out the event which, as far as we can tell, in fact ‘produced’, ‘brought about’, 
‘was responsible for’ or ‘caused’ the action in question.  This is how the ‘champion 
of the causal analysis’ intends to show that “when we offer the fact of the desire and 
belief in explanation, we imply not only that the agent had the desire and belief, but 
that they were efficacious in producing the action” (Davidson 1980, 232).  We are not 
interested in what might have been responsible for my Фing but what in fact was. We 
are interested in identifying the historical, actual cause of my Фing. 
 But many philosophers find Davidson’s proposal unsatisfactory – the consensus 
is that it doesn’t go far enough. This is because it is wedded to a story about event 
causation when what is apparently wanted is a story about property causation, as 
Honderich (1982) first showed. Imagine one event (call it c) – putting green, French 
pears on a scale – and another (call it e) – the hand on the scale moving to the two 
pound mark. No doubt c caused e. But we also know that not all of c’s properties 
played a part in bringing about e. Event e was caused in virtue of event c’s having 
certain instantiated properties and not others – i.e. it was the placing something that 
weighed x amount, in these circumstances that was responsible for the positioning of the 
scale’s hands and not, say, the nationality or colour of the pears that made the 
difference. 
 By comparison and extension by analogy, many naturally suppose that taking 
Davidson’s initial causal analysis seriously requires the conclusion that when citing 
mental predicates in explaining actions the folk must be (at least trying) to identify 
causally relevant properties. If not, it seems we would have to conclude that the folk 
are open to the possibility that mental properties, as a class, may be causally inert; 
that the mental qua mental is causally impotent. It is with this in mind that it is 
widely concluded that “Davidson’s account goes against our intuitions about the 
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causal efficacy of the mental. It seems that only by recognizing that events cause 
other events by virtue of instantiating certain properties, can our intuitions about 
causal relevance be at all expressed” (Corbí and Prades 2000, 13).17  
 But surely this is too quick. Our folk practice tolerates other interpretations. 
Jackson and Pettit (1990, 1988) introduced the idea of programme explanations. They 
observe that: “We can and often do explain by citing a feature which causally 
programmes without causing. Features which causally explain need not cause. This 
is typically what happens when we explain in terms of highly relational properties” 
(Jackson and Pettit 1988, 392). The basic idea is some property F ‘programs for’ or 
‘ensures’ the presence of some other property, P, which is causally efficacious with 
respect to G, although F lacks causal efficacy with respect to G.18  So, to use their 
own example, ‘fragility’ is a dispositional property that is instantiated by a range of 
possible base properties, any one of which would cause (and one which does), e.g., 
glass breaking, in certain specifiable situations – by involving certain impacts. Of 
course, explanations that cite mental predicates are more informative than those that 
only cite dispositional properties; but plausibly explanations of both sorts might 
share the feature that they convey information that is not conveyed by explanations 
citing base properties that do the direct causal labour.  
 Emphatically, I am not seeking to defend or even place bets on the ultimate 
success of the programme explanation proposal. That is well beyond the scope of 
this paper. It will suffice for my purposes to use it as a foil to assess the standard 
reasons for rejecting the very possibility that it might tell an adequate story about 
our folk practice. Kim tells, for example, that: “explanatory relevance or efficacy … 
is too weak to be satisfying. To my mind any vindication of psychological 
explanation worth having must do justice to the ‘because’ in “She winced because 
she felt a sudden pain in the elbow” and to do this we need a more robust sense of 
because than is provided by programme explanation” (Kim 2000, 77). Apparently 
the trouble with that account is that: “the only relevance that is present here seems 
to be informational relevance” (Kim 2000, 75). 
 Allegedly, this is not good enough. It fails to supply what is really required. 
Thus, “If you are willing to give up on mental causation and a robust notion of 
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mental causal explanation and live with a looser and weaker model of explanatory 
relevance, you can perhaps make use of David Lewis’ idea that ‘to explain an event 
is to provide some information about its causal history’” (Kim 2000, 75). This won’t 
do. Why not? 
 Kim assumes that the only kind of mental causation worth wanting is the 
productive sort, where mentality has the “power to bring about its effects in a 
continuous process of generation and production” (Kim 2007, 236). He insists on the 
need for a ‘thick’ conception of causation that involves ‘real connectedness’. Thus 
attempts such as Jackson’s and Pettit’s (and others inspired by Lewis) are dismissed 
as too weak and too relaxed; they threaten to cheapen or dilute the idea that reason 
explanations are genuine causal explanations – i.e. that they are causal explanations 
at all. 
 
Explanation is a pretty loose and elastic notion … no one should legislate what 
counts and doesn’t count as explanation, excepting only this namely when we 
speak of ‘causal explanation’, we should insist … that what is invoked as a cause 
really be a cause (Kim 2000, 76).  
 
Real causation is apparently “productive causation, which respects the 
locality/contiguity condition” (Kim 2007, 236).  We need this because what we are 
after is real connectedness. What is the source of these convictions about genuine 
‘robust mental causation’ (Kim 2005, 22)? Why should we accept Kim’s demands in 
this case? 
 As the possibility of an alternative explanation (by means of programme 
explanation) makes clear the issue cannot be settled by attending to our folk 
practices alone. Without additional support to secure it Kim’s demand is 
problematic. For the fact is that there are stronger and weaker ways to make sense of 
the claim that when we give and receive reason explanations “it is only worth 
mentioning those properties of the event that are relevant to the causal processes at 
stake” (Corbí and Prades 2000, 13, emphasis mine).   
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 It is an unwarranted imposition to insist that in highlighting ‘what’s worth 
mentioning’ the folk are necessarily offering explanations that aim to directly pick out 
causal properties – properties that are productive of actions in a broadly mechanical 
sense. Such a conclusion is simply not justified by looking at the folk practice in 
isolation. It is entirely possible that what the folk find worth mentioning may be 
only, strictly speaking, informationally relevant and not causally productive. 
Nothing explanatorily pertinent would be lost if this were so. Put starkly, that the 
factors cited by the folk are worth mentioning does not entail that they pick out (or 
attempt to pick out) causally relevant properties per se. Hence, it does not follow that 
in talking of beliefs and desires the folk are referring to mental properties that 
denote causally efficacious mental types – properties that when appropriately 
instantiated productively and mechanically bring about actions in the way supposed 
by traditional analytic functionalists. To think otherwise is to simply assume a 
certain narrowly based, input/output version of commonsense functionalism that 
defines mental states as internal causes is a bona fide characterization of our folk 
commitments. But if this assumption is the true basis of Kim’s demand then it is not 
independently justified, and his rejection of viable alternatives (such as programme 
explanation) is blatantly question-begging.  
 Indeed, the mere existence of a plausible rival interpretation shows that there is 
no logical link between what the folk find worth mentioning and the idea that 
mental states are causal ‘in the productive sense’. Nevertheless, Kim is obdurate 
that: “metaphysics still won’t go away. For the only way in which I believe that we 
can understand the idea of causal explanation presupposes the idea that the event 
invoked in a causal explanation is in reality a cause of the phenomenon to be 
explained” (Kim 2000, 61). He tells us that without this stronger, robust sense of 
mental causation in play our attempts to understand human agency and knowledge 
will be brought to ruin (Kim 2005, 9-10). Clearly, we should be unmoved by such 
fears (at least at this stage), since the claim that productive mental causation is 




 It might be thought that there is some general argument waiting in the wings that 
would establish that the only viable notion of causation is the productive sort. It 
might be supposed that such an argument would supply the requisite additional 
support. Of course, it wouldn’t, unless it was already conceded that our folk practice 
requires a robust, productive notion of causation and not merely informational 
relevance. And, again, to assume that would be clearly question begging.  
 In any case, this is not the strategy Kim adopts. For other good reasons, he elects 
to take the more direct route. He is prepared to treat mentality as a special case, 
stating that “we need not concern ourselves with this general issue about causation” 
(Kim 2007, 236). Although he does (naughtily) assume that we need to invoke some 
notion of causation or other if we are to do justice to our folk practice, he attempts to 
establish positively that only the productive notion of causality will do.  He states:  
 
It seems to me that counterfactual dependence is not enough to sustain the causal 
relation involved in our idea of acting upon the natural course of events and bringing 
about changes so as to actualize what we desire and intend. An agent is someone who, 
on account of her beliefs, desires, emotions, intentions and the like has the 
capacity to perform actions in the physical world: that is to cause her limbs and 
other bodily parts (e.g., the vocal cords) to move in appropriate ways (Kim 2007, 
236, emphases added). 
 
One it might be thought that Kim is claiming in this passage is that because we 
experience our agency as productively causal, this gives us compelling grounds for 
thinking that it is. To establish this would have the advantage of providing an 
independent basis for rejection other non-productive proposals about the nature of 
mental causation. But there are reasons to doubt the truth of that claim. First and 
foremost, experiencing our agency whenever we act (let alone experiencing it as 
productively causal) is not a regular feature of our phenomenology. Those who have 
extensively explored both the character of our sense of agency, and the ways that it 
makes itself manifest, argue that it takes the form of pre-reflective, implicit or tacit 
experience. It is a regular feature of acting only in the sense that if it went missing 
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one would suddenly notice it – one would find oneself doing things that would feel 
alien (see Gallagher 2007, and also Horgan and Tienson 2002).  
 If so, there is no secure route from facts about our standard phenomenology of 
agency to the idea that mental states productively cause actions. Worse still, even if 
experiences of productive agency do sometimes occur, noticeably so, when we ‘act 
on the natural course of events’ or ‘bring about changes’ in the world this is not 
universally the case. A sense of our productively bringing about changes is not 
always and everywhere a feature of our acting based on what we think, desire or 
intend.  Of course, we are aware that changes occur but surely, we do not always feel 
that we bring about such changes when we act based on our beliefs and desires – the 
parade cases under examination. To recall my earlier example, although it may be 
true that my belief that ‘a friend will visit at four o’clock’ (and not my earlier 
promise to my wife) was decisive in my acting appropriately with respect to the 
dirty dishes it hardly follows that for this to be so I must have experienced myself as 
doing it for this reason and not the other.  
 If our commitment to mental causation as productive is not built into our 
experience of agency, then perhaps there is some other source for the idea behind 
Kim’s conviction that “agency requires productive causation” (Kim 2007, 236). After 
all, in the cited passage Kim speaks, not of experiences but of ‘our idea of acting on 
the natural course of events’. But if the thought is that this idea is simply built into 
‘our’ or ‘the’ concept of agency then we are dangerously close, yet again, to making 
appeal to what everyone and anyone finds obvious. We are thrown back on 
intuition mongering and the idea that we all share an implicit folk theory. There is 
little doubt that many folk subscribe to the idea that mental phenomena are causal in 
a  productive, mechanical way. It is a popular thought and may indeed be said to 
form part of the commonsense picture of the mind. Many riders of the Clapham 
omnibus would probably endorse it, if asked.  But that surely does not matter. What 
matters is why they think this.  
 If the preceding observations are correct it is not because the folk have closely 
attended to what they do when using their folk concepts in practice. Rather it is 
much more likely that this commonplace view is, ultimately and quite indirectly, 
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sponsored by “a certain picture of the world; the mechanical/causal world picture. 
This picture sees the whole of nature as obeying certain general causal laws – the 
laws of physics, chemistry, biology, etc. – and it holds that psychology too has its 
laws, and that the mind fits into the causal order” (Crane 1995, 62).  If acceptance of 
this sort of framework is the ultimate source of the commonsense idea that mental 
must be causal in a productive way then there is a clear problem of circularity in the 
standard presentation, ala Lewis and Kim, of this as a philosophically neutral 
characterization of what is built-into the very idea of mental agency.  
 Furthermore, if this analysis is correct many philosophers will need to abandon 
the pretence that they are in fact engaged in one of their favourite games – i.e. 
reviewing the prospects for the future of folk psychology. In recent years debates on 
this topic have been of focal interest. But it looks as if we’ve been sold a bill of goods 
in accepting as genuine certain familiar assumptions about the character of our folk 
commitments. It is generally assumed that the folk are committed to the idea that 
mental states cause actions in a mechanical way – i.e. that the folk are committed to 
the mechanical model of the mind. On this basis bets are placed on the likelihood of 
showing that other properties in the folk conception can be made compatible with 
the mechanical mind story. Usually this takes the form of trying to show that an 
account of mental representational content is compatible with a computational 
account of mental processing.  
 Fodor has done more than most to marry these two. Nevertheless, he realizes that 
to make a secure bond adjustments are required to what he takes to be the folk 
picture. Thus he tells us, “It is obscure how externalist intentional laws could be 
computationally implemented. Very well, then, let there be another kind of 
intentionality – let there be, as one says, ‘narrow content’ as well as ‘broad’ content – 
such that narrow content is ipso facto not externalist” (Fodor 1994, 17). The 
proposed revision is motivated by the assumption that the laws of folk psychology 
must be ‘narrow’: i.e. that they should only invoke intrinsic, local properties that are 
internal to agents. This is required if they are to be causal in the right sort of – 
productive, mechanical - way.  
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 Others are far less sanguine about folk psychology, so understood, finding a 
future secured in a mature scientific psychology. They hold that the explanatory 
posits of a mature scientific psychology are unlikely to smoothly accommodate folk 
psychology. On this basis, its wholesale rejection or elimination is anticipated.  
 Taking it for granted that folk psychology incorporates a commitment to the idea 
that mental states are productively causal they doubt that its other commitments are 
compatible with this idea. Thus Ramsey remarks, “Folk psychology is committed to 
the existence of mental representations. Therefore, for folk psychology to be 
vindicated, the correct scientific theory needs to invoke, at the very least, inner 
cognitive representations as well” (2007, 114, emphasis added).  He holds that this is 
unlikely, arguing persuasively that the best theories in cognitive science do not posit 
anything resembling the kinds of truth-evaluable representations that folk 
psychology trades in.  With more punch, Churchland expresses the same concern in 
the following way: “neuroscience is unlikely to find ‘sentences in the head’... on the 
strength of this assumption, I am willing to infer that folk psychology is false” (1991, 
65). The bottom line is that for these thinkers folk psychology will be in good 
standing, if and only if, its commitments can be shown to be consistent with a 
mechanical model of the mind.  
 All parties to this dispute about the future of folk psychology subscribe to a fairly 
restrictive understanding of the requirements of a properly scientific psychology. 
But more than that, they are really only placing bets on the likelihood of 
incorporating a particular picture of folk psychology into (what they take to be) a 
proper scientific psychology. The picture of folk psychology in question is, as 
argued above, presumptuous. It presumes that folk practice is committed to the 
view that mental states are productively causal. Hence, these thinkers regard the 
folk as wedded to a particular understanding of the way that contentful mental 
states cause actions – i.e. they assume that the folk assume that there are such things 
as ‘inner’, representational mental states that ‘mechanically produce’ behaviour.  I 
have been at pains to show that this is an interpretation of the commitments of 
practicing folk psychologists, but despite its seductive attractions it is not supported 
by careful attention to what the folk do (see Hutto 2004, 2008a). Of course, it is also 
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an interpretation that is unhealthily, and circularly, bound up with the standard 
supposition that folk psychology just is a kind of low-level theory – one that posits the 
existence of ‘inner’ mental states, such as beliefs and desires, as a means by which to 
causally explain outward behaviour and action.  
 Close scrutiny of what is truly implied by the commitments of our folk practices – 
i.e. as revealed by the way the folk use their concepts – shows that these familiar 
interpretations are without support. The bottom line is that determining whether it 
is coherent to suppose that mental properties, such as intentionality, are causally 
efficacious in a way that is compatible with a vision of the mind as mechanical is, 
despite appearances, simply not the same project as determining whether our folk 
understanding of mind, as revealed in our everyday practices, can be naturalized.  
To suggest otherwise is to risk a charge of false advertising. 
 
6. Forget the Folk 
 
An attractive option at this juncture, at least for philosophers with a particular 
agenda, will be to shout ‘Forget the folk’. Perhaps, there is a problem with Canberra-
style naturalism. Perhaps it is presumptuous about the nature of folk commitments 
in the very framing of its project. Perhaps it makes unwarranted assumptions about 
the nature and content of folk psychology.  Surely, the cure is to abandon all interest 
in folk conceptions, full stop. After all, why should serious metaphysical musings 
about the mental be beholden to our ordinary use of concepts?  
 It seems that one might coherently reject such an interest and still be concerned 
with whether minds can be mechanical simply because one accepts, as an axiomatic 
general truth, that all of nature is mechanical. The universe might be imagined, 
along Newtonian lines, as an enormous clockwork device. Accordingly, if minds are 
part of the great natural machine then they must be mechanical – on the assumption 
that only properties that are mechanical, or reduce to mechanical, are natural. The 
job of the naturalist who endorses these assumptions is to determine if minds, given 
their special properties, really are natural, in the light of the above restriction. Even 
Quineians recognize that it is incumbent on naturalists to explain the sorts of belief-
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forming and reason-giving activities that ground scientific investigations. Nothing 
guarantees in advance that the ‘mechanical mind’ story is best suited for, or even 
capable, of that task; indeed all the evidence of its incompatibility with truth 
evaluable accounts of representational content suggests just the opposite. 
 At first glance, pursuing this path seems to be a wholly coherent naturalistic 
project, at least if we measure coherence by popularity. It or something very like it 
looks, de facto, to have launched thousands upon thousands of philosophical 
speculations. Presented in this bold form, without qualification, it has the advantage 
of being revealingly unpretentious – revealingly, because any naturalist intent on 
motivating this sort of project will ultimately need to justify their starting 
assumption about the nature of nature. This is a tall task – and not one that is likely 
to succeed if based solely on scientific considerations. Ultimately, it would require 
establishing that the seventeenth century clockwork analogy is still viable in the 
light of twenty-first century thinking about the nature of reality – and, prima facie, 
that hardly looks credible. The risks are high for naturalists of this kind since they 
may be operating with mistaken assumptions about the best scientific conception of 
nature. 
 Still, there is a deeper problem. A major issue which divides naturalists concerns 
the referent of the term ‘natural’. This is evident in current debates concerning the 
truth of physicalism. Popular formulations of physicalism state that ‘all natural 
phenomena are physical phenomena’ or that ‘physical features and facts exhaust all 
the facts’ (such that once the physical details of the world are in place and 
configured everything else follows automatically by strict entailment). Nevertheless, 
there are naturalists who coherently reject physicalism, arguing that ‘natural’ and 
‘physical’ are not co-extensive terms. They hold that not all natural properties can be 
equated to or identified with physical properties. For them some natural – non-
physical (e.g. phenomenal) – properties are primitive, existing in their own right 
alongside or in addition to physical properties. 
 It is clear that one of the crucial hinges in the debate about what falls under the 
concept ‘natural’ is the way disputants understand the characteristics of mental 
properties. It is the legitimacy of their characterizations of such properties that 
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determines if they are right to suppose that mental properties are irreducibly special. 
Yet, if deciding the fate of mental properties is unavoidable (which arguably, it is) 
and any understanding of mental properties requires making appeal to and 
interrogating our everyday or folk conceptions (which arguably, it does) then we are 
back to square one. The trouble is that it is unclear what else could possibly ground 
such conclusions if not an appeal to the way that the folk use their concepts. Without 
such an appeal what else could possibly decide how we ought to think about the 
nature of mental properties? What could possibly ground such debates? 
 In this light, it seems there is no option but for naturalists to take an interest in 
what the folk talk about when putting their concepts to good use. We ought to be 
interested in the possibility of making sense of things and how they stand to our 
best theories of what there is in nature. But if we are to investigate these questions 
properly we will need to adopt a more unassuming style of naturalism than has 
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1  It was so named by its critics O’Leary-Hawthorne and Price (1996) for the following reason: “Since 
Canberra is a planned city founded originally as the seat of the Federal Government of Australia, its 
detractors complain that it lacks the features that arise naturally in cities that grow organically and 
have diverse inhabitants that are not government bureaucrats. Originally an ironic suggestion, the 
metaphor turns on the allegation that the Canberra plan adopts a view of language that misses its 
fundamental diversity” (Braddon-Mitchell and Nola, 2009, 1).  
 
2 We were warned, some time ago, that: “when we have got a picture of our ordinary way of 
speaking we are tempted to say that our way of speaking does not describe the facts as they really 
are” (Wittgenstein PI § 402). 
 
3  Many nowadays are quite critical of this Quineian vision and the sort of instrumentalism about 
theories that it promotes. As Fodor quips: “Could the goal of scientific activity really just be to make 
up stories that accommodate one’s sensory promptings? Would that be a way for a grown man to 
spend his time?” (Fodor 1994, 193). 
 
4 Everyday thought and talk is regarded as theoretical because it involves commitment to some or 
other conceptual scheme. For Quine, this is true of any intellectual activity that goes beyond mere 
responding to the deliverances of sensory stimulation or the making of rudimentary (i.e. non-
referential, non-reified) observations. Hence, even the most basic classifications made in ordinary life 
about objects and their properties are deemed inferential, hypothetical and theoretical. 
 
5  Thus “In ascribing propositional attitudes to ourselves as our basic cognitive states, and explaining 
our behaviour in their terms, we are evidently trying to characterize a truly amazing cognitive 
machine – the brain – in terms of exactly one parochial game that only one species of animal has 
recently learned to play: language. From this perspective, why should we suspect, even for a 
moment, that human language would reflect the basic elements and structure of the brain’s 
cognition?” (Churchland 2007, p. 180, see also Ramsey 2007). 
 
6 I believe there are compelling philosophical as well as empirical reasons for thinking that all 
explanatory versions of theory theory are false (see Hutto 2008a, ch. 8, 9 and 11, 2009a).    
 
7 It is a mistake to assume that believing in beliefs (as the folk do) necessarily constitutes having an 
implicit theory. Nor should we automatically suppose that learning how to make sense of actions in 
terms of reasons necessarily involves the acquisition of one. Simply put: “Learning to identify things 
is not coming to have theories” (Dilman 1996, 185).  For further discussion of this point see Hutto 
(2009b, p. 33-34). 
 
8  Philosophers have been moved to try to take experimental soundings of folk thinking. For example, 
to ascertain whether or not desires are commonly conceived as causes Pigden (2009) surveyed two 
groups of university students (one from England, the other from New Zealand). The aim was to 
probe their conceptual intuitions. Questionnaires focusing on three vignettes were used. The 
participants were asked to provide ‘commonsense obvious’ answers, i.e. those they were inclined to 
give “without too much thinking” (p. 237).  Based on what they said in response to these probes it 
was concluded that “the majority of students are inclined to think of desires as causes” (p. 239).  Not 
only is the set-up of this sort of experiment questionable the results stand in need of serious 
interpretation.  There is clearly more than one possible understanding of cause - which one are these 





                                                                                                                                                       
9 Jackson seems to propose exactly this. For him, the sort of conceptual analysis involved in stage one 
of the Canberra plan allegedly depends on making “appeal to what seems most obvious and central 
[about the concept in question], as revealed by our intuitions about possible cases” (Jackson 1998, 31). 
“My intuitions about possible cases reveal my theory … Likewise, your intuitions reveal your theory. 
To the extent our intuitions coincide with those of the folk, they reveal the folk theory” (Jackson 1998, 
32). 
 
10 See Hutto (2008c) for a discussion of problems that arise for a plausibly weaker, more formal and 
wholly external rendering of the idea that folk psychology ‘contains an implicit theory’, one that 
could be made explicit. 
 
11 Consider the ‘central action principle’. It states how the beliefs and desires must be related in the 
production of actions. To the extent that it reveals a core commitment of folk psychology it reveals a 
structure that is integral to the way the folk actually use their concepts when making sense of actions 
in terms of reasons. Although this structure is not easy to discern in isolated acts of reason ascription 
or understanding, it can be found allegedly by giving careful attention and analysis to the way the 
folk deploy mental predicates when doing so competently (or at least in producing or 
comprehending reason explanations of a certain familiar sort). See Slors (2009) for a discussion in 
favour of the idea that folk psychology competence embeds a belief-desire structure (p. 344-345). See 
Ratcliffe (2007, 2008, 2009) for arguments against this idea. Ratcliffe holds that although the folk make 
use of the concepts of belief and desire in their sense making practices, nothing like the belief-desire 
model, which assigns these concepts distinctive roles, plays a part in those practices. He and I 
disagree about this (see Hutto 2008b). We do agree, more fundamentally, that the question is a live 
one that cannot be settled by purely empirical means – i.e. if by that one thinks it would be settled by 
probing folk intuitions.  Settling it requires substantial philosophical investigation into the way our 
concepts are used when they are being put to good work.  
 
12 To be precise he sometimes regards it as a cluster of inter-related problems stemming from various 
physicalist commitments. 
 
13  The trouble is that: “If both common-sense and physical science are offering causal explanations of 
human behaviour, it is hard to avoid seeing them as competitors” (Sehon 2005, 13).  
 
14 The attempt to naturalize folk psychology by functionalizing it looks promising precisely because 
the roles played by the propositional attitudes are assumed to be causal. Indeed, understood as an 
argument for physicalism (as Lewis first presented it), the emphasis on “causation plays an essential 
role … it is vital that the theoretical roles identified at the first stage of the Lewis program be causal 
roles” (Menzies and Price 2009, 189). The concern of this paper is not to assess the success or 
otherwise of Lewis’ argument for physicalism. Rather it is to ask on what grounds was it decided that 
the roles played by mental states concepts are, in fact, causal?; And if causal, causal in what sense? 
 
15 Kim notes that in some ways the productive notion of causation is also weaker than 
counterfactualist renderings, hence it has an easier time in dealing with pre-emption and over-
determination (Kim 2005, 18). 
 
16  This sea change has entered into philosophical lore: “Although philosophers once denied that 
thoughts could be causes (Anscombe 1957, Melden 1961), today there is agreement that in some 
sense, our ordinary understanding of thoughts attributes to them various causal roles” (Ramsey 2007, 
18). Or again: “Davidson’s (1963, 1967) seminal papers on the explanation of human action have led 
to a new consensus that folk-psychological explanations referencing ‘propositional attitudes’ are a 
species of causal explanations that may play an entirely legitimate role in a scientific psychology 
(whatever Davidson’s reservations about its prospects)” (Greenwood 1991, 4). For a fuller discussion 
see Hutto (1999). 
 
Daniel D. Hutto 
 
36 
                                                                                                                                                       
17 Similarly, McLaughlin (1993) observes that since Davidson only offers us an event-based story 
about causation at best his version of identity theory only guards against token-epiphenomenalism 
and not type-epiphenomenalism. Hence he regards Davidson’s anomalous monism solution as ‘cold 
comfort’. 
 
18 This is reminiscent of Dretske’s proposal to understand mental events as structuring causes. For the 
most up to date statement of this approach see Dretske 2009. 
 
19 I am grateful to Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Joanne Gilles, Britt Harrison, Axel Seemann, Derek 
Strijbos, Marc Slors and the audience of the British Wittgenstein Society conference on ‘Wittgenstein 
and Naturalism’ for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper and the ideas in it. 
